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Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Last year we predicted that the first year of the current U.S. 
recovery would be unusually weak because consumers 
were pessimistic about their long-run economic prospects 
(Runkle 1991). We were right. Consumer spending has 
been exceptionally low in 1992, and after the weakest 
start to any recovery since World War n, overall econom-
ic growth has remained below its postwar average. 
Now we predict that slow economic growth will con-
tinue for at least the next two years because consumers 
are still pessimistic and nearly all other areas of the econ-
omy are weak. This slow-growth prediction seems quite 
reasonable. It comes from the forecasting model that pre-
dicted so well a year ago, and it is consistent with evidence 
which suggests that the economic problems we stressed a 
year ago are unlikely to be solved soon. 
Continuing Weakness 
The current recovery has been weaker than the previous 
eight recoveries by almost every measure. 
Table 1 compares the performance of some key eco-
nomic indicators during the first year of the current recov-
ery with their average performance during the first year of 
other recoveries since 1948. From the beginning of the 
third quarter of 1991 to the end of the second quarter of 
1992, the total value of goods and services produced in 
the United States, adjusted for inflation—known as real 
gross domestic product, or real GDP—grew only 1.6 per-
cent, about one-fourth of its first-year average growth dur-
ing other recoveries. Note that this weakness was wide-
spread: every indicator in Table 1 grew less in the first year 
of this recovery than in the typical recovery. Investment 
grew at less than half its average rate; consumption, at less 
than one-third its average rate; employment, at less than 
one-twentieth its average rate. And instead of growing 
substantially, government spending actually declined. 
Comparing this recovery to the average recovery 
doesn't fully reveal the current poor performance of the 
economy, however. Not only has this recovery been far 
below average; by most measures, it has been weaker than 
any other recovery in the postwar period. While real GDP 
grew only 1.6 percent in the first year of this recovery, it 
has never grown less than 3.5 percent in the first year of 
any other postwar recovery. Consumption, investment, and 
employment also grew much less in this first year of re-
covery than in any other. 
The current recovery seems weaker still when com-
pared to average economic growth over all phases of the 
business cycle. Economic growth is typically fastest at the 
beginning of a recovery. But this time, growth in the first 
year of the recovery was below its average during the 
postwar era. During 1948-91, real GDP has grown at an 
average rate of 3.1 percent. However, real GDP has not 
grown faster than average in any quarter since the end of 
1988. This means that the current recovery is most appro-
*Also Adjunct Associate Professor of Finance, University of Minnesota. 
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A Weak U.S. Recovery . . . 
% Changes From Year Earlier 
at End of First Year of 
Current  Average Postwar 
Indicator  Recovery*  Recovery** 
Real Gross Domestic Product  1.6%  6.1% 
Consumption  1.5  4.6 
Durable Goods  4.5  14.3 
Nondurables and Services  1.1  3.4 
Investment  9.8  22.1 
Business Fixed  2.3  10.4 
Residential  14.5  15.7 
Government Purchases  -1.2  4.4 
Industrial Production  2.0  11.1 
Employment  .2  4.2 
Real Personal Income  2.0  5.0 
*The first year of this recovery started at the start of the third quarter of 1991 and ended at the end 
of the second quarter of 1992. 
'"These are averages of data in the first year of the eight U.S. recoveries during 1948-84. Gross 
domestic product data are not available before 1959, so for 1948-58, these averages use gross 
national product data. 
Sources: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor, Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
priately viewed as a continuation of a long period of 
below-average growth. 
Length is one common measure of periods of below-
average growth, and the current slow period has been the 
longest since the end of World War DL Real GDP growth 
has been below average for 15 consecutive quarters— 
nearly twice as long as the previous record of 8 quarters. 
Another common measure of periods of below-average 
growth is the size of their shortfall from the average 
growth rate. Real GDP in the second quarter of 1992 was 
8.8 percent below what it would have been had it contin-
ued to grow at its postwar average rate in each quarter 
since the beginning of 1989. That is the second-largest 
shortfall for any period of slow growth during the past 45 
years. 
A Model Prediction 
How long will this below-average growth last? A statisti-
cal model developed and used by researchers at the Min-
neapolis Fed predicts it will continue until at least the end 
of 1994. Another recession is not predicted during that 
time, but real GDP growth is predicted to remain well 
below the postwar average. 
Table 2 shows what our Bayesian vector autoregression 
model expects in 1993 and 1994 for the key economic 
variables.
1 For comparison, the table also shows the aver-
age values for those variables during 1948-91.
2 
The model predicts that real GDP will grow at an an-
nual rate of 2.3 percent in both 1993 and 1994, substan-
tially below its average growth since 1948. It also predicts 
below-average growth over the next two years for the 
three major components of GDP: consumption, business 
fixed investment (that is, investment in equipment and 
buildings), and government purchases of goods and ser-
vices. Only residential investment—that is, spending on 
the construction of new houses—is predicted to grow sub-
stantially faster than its average growth rate. 
The outlook for inflation is much better than that for 
growth. In each of the next two years, both the consumer 
price index and the GDP deflator are predicted to grow 
only about 3 percent, well below their average annual 
growth of about 4 percent. 
A Quite Accurate Forecast... 
Last year at this time, the model predicted that the first 
year of the current recovery would be much weaker than 
normal. That forecast turned out to be fairly close to the 
mark, and that fact gives credence to the model's current 
forecast that below-average growth will continue for an-
other two years.
3 
Table 3 adds the forecast that the model made last year 
about the economy's performance in the first year of this 
recovery to the data already displayed in Table 1. With a 
few exceptions, the model's predictions were on target. 
The model was certainly correct in its overall predic-
tion of weakness in the recovery. It predicted that most 
key economic indicators, except investment in residential 
housing, would grow less than they have in the first year 
of an average recovery. The model's overall prediction of 
real GDP growth in the first four quarters of the recovery 
^or background on models like this one, see Litterman 1984 and Todd 1984. 
2Data for all variables except GDP are available back to 1948. For that, data are 
available only back to 1959. For 1948-58, we substituted data for gross national 
product. 
3The model used last year is basically the same as that used this year, but there are 
two slight differences. We are now predicting gross domestic product instead of gross 
national product, and we are now using data on both car and light truck sales, instead 
of just car sales, to interpolate inventories. 
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Table 2 
. . . That Our Model Expects to Continue 
Model Forecast*  1948-91 
Indicator  1993  1994  Average1 
Annual Growth Rates 
(4th Qtr. % Changes From Year Earlier) 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  2.3%  2.3%  3.1% 
Consumer Spending  2.1  2.0  3.2 
Durable Goods  3.6  2.7  4.4 
Nondurable Goods and Services  1.9  1.9  3.1 
Investment  3.8  2.7  3.5 
Business Fixed  1.0  1.3  3.3 
Residential  6.9  7.3  3.0 
Government Purchases  .6  .6  3.3 
GDP Price Deflator  3.1  3.2  4.3 
Consumer Price Index  2.8  3.0  4.2 
4th Quarter Levels 
Change in Business Inventories (1987 $)  14.5 bil.  11.9 bil.  14.2 bil. 
Net Exports (1987 $)  -33.7 bil.  -12.9 bil.  -28.4 bil. 
(Exports Less Imports) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate  7.4%  7.2%  5.8% 
(Unemployment as a % of Civilian Labor Force) 
'These are the forecasts of a Bayesian vector autoregression model using data available on October 2,1992. 
"Gross domestic product data are not available before 1959, so for 1948-58, these averages use gross national product data. 
Sources of actual data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
was off by just 1.2 percentage point. In predicting real 
growth during the first four quarters of the five preceding 
recoveries, other professional forecasters were off by 2.7 
percentage points.
4 So our model did quite well. 
Not only was the model's forecast close on overall real 
GDP growth; its success in predicting specific variables 
was remarkable. The model predicted that employment 
would grow only 0.3 percent during the first year of the 
recovery, far below its average growth of 4.2 percent; em-
ployment actually grew 0.2 percent. The model also pre-
dicted the relatively slow growth in industrial production 
and real personal income quite accurately. It successfully 
predicted that the real value of government purchases of 
goods and services would decline in the first year of this 
recovery, that investment spending would grow at about 
half its rate in an average recovery, and that the consump-
tion of durable goods would grow at about one-third its 
average rate. 
The model's only major error was overoptimism about 
growth in the consumption of nondurable goods and ser-
vices. It predicted that this consumption would grow 2.6 
percent during the first year of this recovery—well below 
the average growth of 3.4 percent for the first year of a 
recovery, but well above the actual growth of 1.1 percent. 
4This is a comparison to the consensus prediction of professional forecasters sur-
veyed by the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER). Since last year's model prediction was made after the first 
quarterly GDP data of the recovery were available, we base this comparison on the pre-
dictions of growth for the first year of recovery that were made by the ASA-NBER 
forecasters at comparable times in the previous recoveries (roughly after the first quar-
ter of each recovery). For background on the ASA-NBER survey, see Keane and 
Runkle 1989. 
15 This error is easily explained by looking at how our 
model works. The model bases its predictions on the his-
torical relationships among various economic variables. 
Since such low growth in the consumption of nondurables 
and services had previously only occurred when the econ-
omy was in the midst of a severe recession, the model 
could not have foreseen that growth in this variable could 
be so low during a recovery. 
The model's error on this consumption component was 
the principal cause of its overestimate of total real GDP 
growth. If the model had been correct about its forecast of 
growth in nondurable goods and services consumption, its 
real GDP growth forecast for the first year of the recovery 
would have been within 0.3 percentage point of what ac-
tually happened. 
... Echoed by Long-Term Economic Problems 
The model's prediction of continued slow growth is also 
supported by the evidence on several long-term problems 
facing the economy. 
Consumption 
Perhaps the biggest of these problems is constrained con-
sumption growth. Consumer spending usually provides a 
large percentage of the boost to the economy in any re-
covery. In the United States, consumption accounts for 
about two-thirds of real GDP. Growth in that fraction can 
be split into growth in the amount of consumption spend-
ing per employee and growth in the number of people em-
ployed. A closer look at the consumer sector strongly sug-
gests that both of these parts will remain low in the United 
States for the next two years. Of course, slow consumption 
growth—about 2 percent per year—is exactly what our 
model predicts. 
• Pessimism 
We first suggested a year ago that consumer pessimism 
about economic conditions would restrain economic 
growth (Runkle 1991). Since then, consumer behavior has 
not changed much. 
One indicator of how consumers view the future comes 
from the University of Michigan's index of consumer sen-
timent, a monthly poll taken to find out consumer atti-
tudes toward making different kinds of purchases. That in-
dex was lower in October 1992 than it had been during 
most of the recent recession. 
But the best indicator of consumer pessimism, as we 
argued last year, is how much consumers actually spend. 
Economists express this relationship in what we call the 
Table 3 
A Pretty Good Forecast 
% Changes From Year Earlier 




Forecast!  Actual 
Average Postwar 
Recovery" 
Real Gross Domestic Product  2.8%  1.6%  6.1% 
Consumption  3.0  1.5  4.6 
Durable Goods  5.3  4.5  14.3 
Nondurables and Services  2.6  1.1  3.4 
Investment  11.4  9.8  22.1 
Business Fixed  .9  2.3  10.4 
Residential  17.4  14.5  15.7 
Government Purchases  -1.7  -1.2  4.4 
Industrial Production  2.2  2.0  11.1 
Employment  .3  .2  4.2 
Real Personal Income  2.5  2.0  5.0 
*The first year of this recovery started at the start of the third quarter of 1991 and ended at the end of the second 
quarter of 1992. 
"These are averages of data in the first year of the eight U.S. recoveries during 1948-84. Gross domestic product 
data are not available before 1959, so for 1948-58, these averages use gross national product data. 
fThis is the forecast of a Bayesian vector autogression model using data available on December 12,1991. 
Sources: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor, Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
permanent income hypothesis. This theory suggests that 
people base their current consumption decisions on their 
expectations about their long-run income, not their current 
income. If consumers are optimistic about the long run, 
the theory suggests, they will be willing to spend today 
even if their incomes are growing slowly today. If con-
sumers are pessimistic about the long run, however, not 
only will they be unwilling to increase spending much 
now, but they may also want to act now to reduce the 
amount of debt they hold. That is because they think fu-
ture income increases will not be large enough to let them 
reduce debt later without also reducing consumption. 
If we judge their behavior against this theory, U.S. con-
sumers appear persistently pessimistic. Real consumption 
has increased at an annual rate of only 0.7 percent since 
the beginning of 1989—by far the longest period of slow 
consumption growth in the last 30 years. And real con-
sumption spending per employee has grown at a rate of 
only 0.5 percent since the beginning of 1989. Consumers' 
willingness to take on debt is consistent with pessimism. 
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As Chart 1 shows, although consumers rapidly built up 
their installment debt in the 1980s, they have drastically 
cut back that debt since 1989.
5 
Clearly, consumers are pessimistic. But is their pessi-
mism reasonable? At least two factors suggest that it is. 
One factor is employment and income growth, which 
has been very low during the first year of this recovery. 
Employment increased only 0.2 percent during that time. 
Not only is this the lowest employment growth during the 
first year of a recovery in the last 45 years; it is far below 
the next-worst performance of 1.7 percent growth. And 
since 1989, the average annual growth in employment has 
been only 0.2 percent. At the same time, income growth 
has also been very low. Real disposable personal income 
grew only 2 percent in the first year of this recovery, far 
below its lowest growth in the first year of other recent re-
coveries. And since 1989, real disposable personal income 
has grown at an average annual rate of only 0.9 percent. 
Per employee, it has grown at an average annual rate of 
only 0.7 percent. 
But slow growth in employment and income is not the 
only grounds for consumer pessimism. Another is an in-
crease in permanent layoffs. Even as the recovery started, 
permanent layoffs increased. The percentage of layoffs 
that were permanent hit a new high of 78 percent in the 
second quarter of 1992. Obviously, permanent layoffs cre-
ate hardships that temporary layoffs do not; people must 
move, switch occupations, or accept lower-paying perma-
nent positions, for example. So if consumers now think a 
layoff is more likely to be permanent, they are likely to be 
more pessimistic because of the costs they may face. 
Thus, consumers seem to have good reason for their 
pessimism. Employment and income growth have been 
extremely low for several years, and the increased inci-
dence of permanent layoffs has made consumers worry 
about the security of their jobs. These factors will likely 
contribute to continued consumer caution—and slow con-
sumption growth—over the next two years. 
• Demography 
Even if consumers weren't pessimistic, though, total con-
sumption growth would remain low over the next few 
years because, as we discussed last year, fewer people will 
be entering the work force and finding jobs. 
Over the past 20 years, employment grew much more 
rapidly than did population in the United States. From 
1969 to 1989, employment grew at an annual rate of 2 
percent, while population grew at an annual rate of only 
Chart 1 
Consumers' View of Their Income Outlook 
Outstanding U.S. Consumer Installment Debt 
as % of Total U.S. Personal Income 
Quarterly, 1980:1-1992:2 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
1 percent.
6 Of course, employment cannot grow much 
faster than population forever, and there are reasons to 
believe that employment growth will be slower over the 
next 2 years than it was over the last 20. 
One reason employment grew so quickly relative to 
population in the last two decades is that the working-age 
population grew more quickly than the population as a 
whole. As baby boomers reached working age, employ-
ment naturally grew faster than population because of the 
increase in the fraction of the total population who were 
of working age. While total population grew at an average 
rate of 1 percent over the past 20 years, the working-age 
population grew at an average rate of 1.4 percent. How-
ever, growth in the working-age population dropped to 0.9 
percent in 1991, and it will not rise again in the near fu-
ture. So employment growth will be much slower than it 
has been, unless the fraction of the population who are 
employed grows dramatically. 
5Stricter regulation and higher capital standards for lenders may be contributing to 
the decrease in installment debt. Note, also, that installment debt does not include first-
or second-mortgage debt. 
^ata end in 1989 to allow international comparisons. All data in this section come 
from OECD 1991. 
17 But that is unlikely to happen because this fraction is 
already quite high. In 1970, the fraction of the working-
age population who were employed in the United States 
was far below that in Japan, Germany, or the United King-
dom. The dramatic increase in the fraction of U.S. women 
who are employed has changed that, however. By 1989, 
a larger fraction of the total working-age population was 
employed in this country than in Japan, Germany, or the 
United Kingdom. 
The fraction of U.S. women who are employed will 
probably not continue to rise as rapidly as during the past 
20 years because it is already high. In fact, the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimates that the average 
annual growth in women's employment will drop from 2.8 
percent over the past 15 years to 1.6 percent over the next 
15 years (Kutscher 1991). 
If growth in both the working-age population and the 
fraction of the population who are employed stay well be-
low their average rates during the past 20 years, then em-
ployment growth will certainly be below average. The 
BLS estimates that total employment will grow at an an-
nual rate of 1.3 percent over the next 15 years, far less 
than the 2 percent average growth over the past 20 years 
(Kutscher 1991). 
Below-average employment growth will certainly con-
strain total consumption growth. Even if consumption per 
employee were to grow at its average rate, total consump-
tion growth would remain below average because employ-
ment growth will be slow. And since total consumption is 
about two-thirds of real GDP, if consumption growth is 
low, real GDP growth will be too. 
Commercial Real Estate 
Consumption is not the only component of GDP with a 
weak long-term outlook. The commercial real estate com-
ponent of GDP has a serious oversupply problem. How-
ever, its influence on real GDP growth will be smaller be-
cause it provides a much smaller fraction of total GDP. 
A huge commercial real estate spending boom occurred 
in the United States in the mid-1980s, followed by a bust 
that continues today. This is clear in Chart 2. 
One result of the bust is likely to be little investment in 
business structures for at least several more years. Real in-
vestment in business structures is now about 25 percent 
below its peak. Such investment dropped 8 percent in the 
first year of the recovery alone. And the number of square 
feet of business structures that were completed fell 11 per-
cent during the first year of the recovery, to its lowest lev-
el in 30 years. Recent surveys indicate that the vacancy 
rates for both industrial and downtown office properties 
are at historic highs and that net absorption of office 
space—the change in the total number of occupied square 
feet—has shrunk to 10 percent of its peak rate, which oc-
curred during the second quarter of 1987 (CB 1992a,b). 
The dismal prospects for commercial real estate are reflec-
ted in the model's low forecast of growth in business fixed 
investment over the next two years. 
Government Spending 
Government spending also will be weak for some time. 
Like consumer spending, this sector typically provides a 
boost to the economy at the start of a recovery. But with 
fiscal problems at all levels, government purchases of 
goods and services will not provide any boost this time. 
Indeed, the model predicts that real government purchases 
will increase only 0.6 percent in each of the next two 
years, well below the postwar average of 3.3 percent per 
year. 
The budget problems at the federal level are well 
known. The federal deficit is likely to constrain any major 
federal spending initiatives. Further weakness in this sector 
could come from planned reductions in defense spending. 
But the big constraint on government spending will 
Chart 2 
The Commercial Real Estate Boom and Bust 
Value of Commercial Mortgages Outstanding at U.S. Financial Institutions, 
Adjusted for Inflation by Gross Domestic Product Deflator 
Quarterly, 1980:1-1992:1 
$ Bil. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, U.S. Department of Commerce 
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come from the state and local levels. Over the past eight 
years, real state and local government spending has grown 
at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, far faster than either real 
GDP or real personal income. Since most state budget 
plans were based on the assumption that tax revenues 
would continue to grow at a high rate, most states are 
now experiencing financial crises. Most state budget sur-
pluses are at their lowest level in 15 years, and the Na-
tional Governors' Association predicts that in 1993 state 
spending will grow slower than the price level, only about 
one-third as fast as state spending grew in the 1980s (Pear 
1992). The governors' group also predicts that, by the end 
of 1993, states will trim government employment nearly 
2 percent. 
Other Problems 
Along with the three major long-term problems afflicting 
the U.S. economy, other components of real GDP worsen 
the outlook for growth, at least in the near term. Although 
our forecasting model predicts export growth will be well 
below its level of the late 1980s, export growth could be 
even lower because of world economic conditions. Many 
major trading partners of the United States have had slow-
er real GDP growth in recent quarters than this country 
has. Since their growth is the major determinant of U.S. 
export growth, that could be quite low in the near future. 
Recall that one of the few bright spots in our model's 
forecast is residential construction. In each of the next two 
years, spending on new homes is predicted to grow about 
4 percentage points more than the historical average. De-
mographic trends may well dilute these predicted increas-
es, however; the potential first-time home-buying popula-
tion—mostly those 25-35 years old—is much smaller 
than it used to be. 
Conclusion 
Both the model's predictions and the U.S. economy's 
problems clearly signal slow growth for at least the next 
two years, and there appears to be no relief in sight. Cer-
tainly there could be strong growth in an isolated quarter 
or two; such strong growth can always happen because of 
special factors. But we should not expect an extended pe-
riod of strong growth anytime soon. 
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